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JOINT DECISION MAKING
By Wallace E. Huffman
and Mark D. Lange
When a husband or (and) wife in a farm household do not participate in
off-farm work, optimal hours of off-farra work for one or both of them will be
at the boundary of one or two non-negativity constraints. These boundary
solutions have important implications for household choices because when they
occur, the marginal value of an individual's time is no longer determined by
the external labor market. It is determined internally to the household by
weighing the demand for an individual's on-farm labor and home time against
his (her) time endowment. Each time that a binding non-negativity constraint
is encountered, the economic structure—variables to be included and
coefficients—of household choice functions is changed.
The objective of this paper is to propose and fit a recursive multiple-
equation econometric model of the joint decisions for off-farm work of a
husband and wife in farm households where endogenous switching of the econo
metric structure occurs whenever binding non-negativity constraints occur.^
In implementing this conceptually appealing framework, econometric problems
arise due to small subsample sizes and near-multicollinearity. The final
estimates of the off-farm labor supply equations are obtained by applying
ridge regression to multiple Tobit-type unconditional off-farm labor supply
functions for husbands and wives.
The model presented here differs significantly from earlier econometric
studies of off-farra work of farm household members. The papers by Huffman
(1980) and Sumner (1982) consider only the off-farm work of farmers, Barnum
and Squires (1979) have only one household time endowment in their model.
They aggregate a household's own and hired farm labor together and assume that
the external labor market always determines the marginal value of human time.
Rosenzweig (1980) considers two types of labor, male and female, but he does
not take full account of changes in the structure of wage labor supply
functions when non-negativity constraints are encountered.
In section one, decisions on husband's and wife's off-farm work are
considered in a model of agricultural household optimization where decisions
on their time allocation are made jointly with other consumption and farm
production decisions. The econometric model is presented in section two.
Section three describes the data and discusses the empirical estimates of
equations explaining off-farm work participation, off-farm labor demand or
wage offers, and off-farm labor supply for husbands and wives. Conclusions
are presented in the final section.
A Model of Time Allocation
The labor supply decisions of husbands and wives in farm households can
be summarized in an optimizing model which permits dual employment on their
farm and at off-farm jobs. The model presented here, which guides the
empirical analysis, is similar to ones presented in Huffman (1973, 1980),
Rosenzweig (1980), Sumner (1982) and Strauss (1986). The decision unit is a
single-family farm household; and to simplify the analysis, the time allo
cation of only two adult household members, the husband and wife, are
considered. Husband's and wife's time are assumed to be heterogenous and,
therefore, must be indexed separately. Each individual receives an endowment
of time each period which the household makes plans to allocate among work on
their farm, work off their fara, and to home tiiae. Home time is a residual
category that includes mainly household work and leisure. An individual's
hours of off-farm work may be zero, i.e., a nonnegativity constraint is
implied. The allocation of husband's and wife's time are summarized as:
(I) T = T. + T + T. , T >0
f m h* m
where T is the time endownent, T^ is farm labor, T is market or off-farm
' f ' m
labor, and T^ is home time.
The husband and wife may work on their farm and at off-farm jobs to
obtain income to spend on the market-goods component of consumption (and on
2investment goods). The farm household is assumed to be competitive in output
and input markets. It receives cash income from net farm income (P^Y^ - W^X^)
and other household income (V. ), and possibly from off-farm wage work (W T ),
" mm
and income is spent on goods for consumption (Y, ):
h
^2) W'T^ + PpY. - W.X. + V, « P^Y^mm ff ff h hh
where is the price vector for farm products (Y^); is the outlay on
purchased farm inputs, and is the price vector for consumption goods Y^.
In general, commuting expenses to off-farm work depend on the aaount of off-
farm work and commuting distance (M^), i.e., C(T^, M^). To simplify, marginal
and average commuting cost per unit are assumed to be equal and to depend
•3
only on commuting distance, i.e., C = C (M ). The wage rate net of
m mm
commuting cost is W = W - C ,
m ra m
The off-farm labor demand or wage-offer equations facing husbands and
wives are assumed to depend on their marketable human capital (H^), local
labor market characteristics (L ) and lob characteristics (Z ) but are assumed
m m
to be independent of their hours worked during the current period. The latter
assumption may be a reasonable approximation and it simplifies the resulting
empirical model.^ The market labor demand or off-farm wage functions are
summarized in vector form as:
(3) W = W (H ,L ,Z ).
m m m m m
The expectation is that increasing marketable human skills, e.g., formal
schooling, vocational training, and experience shifts the wage offer or labor
demand curve faced by an individual upward. Local labor-market conditions
affect wage offers when workers and firms are immobile. Land rental and
ownership opportunities are expected to be a source of reduced labor mobility
in rural labor markets.
The farm business is assumed to produce and sell one farm output (Y^).
Variable inputs in farm production are husband's and wife's farm labor
and purchased inputs CX^), including labor hired from other households.^
Farm labor supplied from outside the farm household is assumed to be hetero
geneous to household supplied labor because of different entrepreneurial
skills. The efficiency of farm production is assumed to depend on himan
capital of the husband and wife (H^), e.g., general schooling, fanning
experience, and on other farm-specific characteristics (Z^), e.g., length of
growing season, precipitation, soil characteristics. The technology of farm
production is represented by the following concave production function:
W Yj. = F(T^, Xj; Hp
The production function (4) is substituted into the income constraint (2) to
obtain a new cash income constraint:
^ PfF(Tj,Xj; H,. Z^) - = 0.
Household members' v^lfare is assumed to be sisnmarized in a single,
hybrid household-utility function. This hybrid function results from substi
tuting a household production function into a standard ordinal household-
utility function (Pollak and Wachter 1975). Ifousehold utility is assumed to
depend on the inputs of home time of the husband and wife (T^) and of goods
purchased for direct or indirect consumption
C6) U=' U(T^,Y^; ,Z^), 3U/8£i > 0, 3^U/3£J^ < 0, fi = T^,Y^,H^.
n n n n n h n
Thus, Tj^ and Y^ are assumed to be objects of current choice, but household
utility also depends on human capital variables that affect the efficiency of
household prodution 6*S'» schooling, experience or age; and other
household characteristics (Z^)» number of children in the household,
commuting distance from the residence to shopping, recreating, and schooling
centers.^
The key household decision or choice variables in this study are T^, the
amount of husband's and wife's time supplied to off-farm work, but these vari
ables are determined jointly with , Y^, T^, Y^, and T^^. The condit ions for
optimal choices are obtained by maximizing equation (6) subject to resource
constraints imposed by equations (I), including the nonnegativity constraint
for off-farm work, and (5). Assuming an interior solution for all choices
except T , the first-order conditions for a constrained maximum are:
m
(7) X[V^ - Wf] = 0,
(8) - Y = 0,
(9) AW* - Y < 0. T > 0, T (XW - y) = 0,
m m m m
(10) U„ - Y = 0,
h
(11) Uy - XP = 0,
h
(12) T - T. - T - T. = 0,
L m n
(13) w;t„ - PjF(Tj,Xj; = 0.
where y and X are Lagrange multipliers for marginal utility of time, and
income, respectively, and Uj and Fj are partial derivatives of the functions
U and F, respectively.
Equations (8)-(10) give conditions that must be met for optimal time
allocation by a husband and wife. Both members are assumed to always have
optimal positive hours of farm and home tim«if, i.e., equations (8) and (10)
are equalities. Equation (9) provides the optimality condition for off-farm
work. If XW^ - Y or - y/X <0, then the marginal value of an individual's
home time or farm labor exceeds his (her) wage offer, net of coBmiuting cost,
*
for off-farm work, and optimal hours of off-farm work are zero, x.e,, T = 0.
m
If XW' - Y or W - y/X = 0, then an individual's off-farm wage, net of
m m
commuting cost, equals the marginal value of his (her) home time or farm labor
and optimal hours of off-farm work may be positive. Furthermore, when farm
and off-farm work requires specialized skills (e.g., formal or on-the-job
training) and households are risk neutral, individuals tend to specialize in
one major type of work activity (Becker 1981).
When an interior solution for T occurs, the off-farm labor market deter-
m '
mines the marginal value of husband's and wife's time, i.e., y/X - W. Equa-
m
tions (7)-(9) are then the conditions for profit maximizing farm input usage,
and they can be solved independently of the rest of the equations to obtain
the optimal choices (*) on farm inputs. Including the demand functions for
husband's and wife's farm labor:
•'f = "f. «f. Zf)-
To obtain the demand functions for husband's and wife's home time, all of the
information contained in equations (7)-(13) are required:
(15) T* = D
h
The off-farm labor demand functions can be derived from the human time
constraint (1) and the demand functions for farm (14) and home time (13):
(16) T* =T- T* - t; (w;.Wj,Pj.P^.Vj,,Hj,Z,.H^,Z^).
m
Equation (16) explains household decisions on off-farm work when interior
solutions occur for all choices.
Optimal hours of off-farm work for either the husband or wife or for both
of them may be at the boundary of the nonnegativity constraint, and one or
both of them do not participate in off-farm wage work. These boundary solu
tions have important implications for other household choices because when
they occur, the marginal value of an individual's time is no longer determined
by the external labor market. It is determined internally to the household by
weighing Che demand for an individual's farm labor and home time against his
(her) time endowment. In this model, if the husband and (or) wife do not
participate in off-farm wage work, farm input decisions cannot be separated
from household consumption decisions and the off-farm wage rate for the non-
participant is no longer a determinate of optimal household choices for ,
and X^. Thus, each time that the boundary of a nonnegativity
constraint is encountered, the economic structure—variables included and
coefficients—of household choice functions are changed. Also, see Lee and
Pitt, and Wales and Woodland,
Selected comparative-static results are summarized. If home time is a
normal good, an increase in household other income (V^) increases or shift
rightward the demand for an individual's home hours. For an off-farm work
participant, his (her) farm hours remain unchanged. Thus, his (her) off-farm
labor supply curve is shifted leftward by an increase in V^, If, however, the
increase in home time is large, optimal hours of his (her) off-farm work could
be reduced to zero. For a nonparticipant, all increases in an individual's
home time are accompanied by an equal hourly reduction in farm work.
The wage elasticity of off-farm hours can be positive, negative, or zero.
For a wage-work participant whose home time is a normal good, an exogenous
increase in his (her) off-farm wage has two opposing effects on his (her)
off-farm labor supply. First, a pure substitution effect, holding utility
constant, decreases the demand for his home time, and, second, an income
effect increases the quantity demanded of his home time. Thus, these two
effects pull in opposite directions on off-farm hours. An exogenous rise in
the wage rate of a wage-work participant increases the opportunity cost of
farm hours and is expected to reduce his (her) farm hours. For a nonparti
cipant, a rise in the off-farm wage rate increases the probability that he
(she) becomes ati off-farm work participant. The expected effects of accumu
lated human capital and other variables on off-farm and farm hours are
generally a priori uncertain in direction. When one of the human capital
variables increases, it may increase the efficiency of farm and (or) household
production but more information is required about the nature of the change
before predictions can be made. This does not mean that some of these
variables will not have strong effects empirically on farm, off-farm, and home
hours.
Some important issues that may affect how husbands and wives allocate
their time have been neglected. Different sources of income may he taxed
differently. Useful tax information is, however, not available. Hours of
work may be directly a source of utility or disutility. This we cannot easily
test empirically. Current on-the-job experience can be expected to raise
future labor productivity. An individual's age is highly correlated with the
length of the expected payoff period for human capital investments (Becker
1964; Mincer) and incentives for nonhuman asset accumulation are closely tied
to age (Ghez and Becker). Thus, husband's age controls for several age-
related effects on a household's choices.
The Econometric Model
The econometric model for husband's and wife's off-farm work contains a
maximum of four structural equations — two market labor demand functions and
two off-farm labor supply functions. The model is recursive in the sense that
each market labor-demand function contains only one endogenous variable, the
wage, but it excludes off-farm hours; and the off-farm labor supply functions
contain endogenous variables of off-farm hours and one or two off-farm wage
rates. This four-equation system is modified to permit structural
10
changes variables included and coefficients—that are expected in the
off-farm labor supply functions when a husband and (or) wife do not
participate in off-farm work. The structure of the market labor demand
functions are. however, not expected to be affected by a spouse's decision on
off-farm work. They have only one structure for each sex.
The econometric model is equations (17)-(20):
(17) +Vp if
(Wj^ is unobservable if
(18) ^2* ^2 ^ "2
(W^ is unobservable if <W^)
(19) 1^ - W^a^^^ +W^a^^i + ^"l ^2 ^ ^2
=W^ajj2 ^ 2^12 ^2' "l ^ "l ^2 ^ "2
• 0 , if and
or and
(20) +p^l' \ ^
"2^223 ^ ^23 ^ ^23' "1 < "2 > "2
= 0 . if Wj^ > and
or and
where
Wj = hourly market wage rate of the j-th spouse, (j « 1 for husbands,
2 for wives),
Xj »• vector of labor market and human capital variables for the j-th
spouse,
11
RWj « Che reservation wage rate for off-farm work of the j-th spouse,
Tj = hours of off-farm wage work supplied by the j-th spouse,
Z = vector of nonwage household and farm control variables,
^•>^'1,0 ~ structural coefficients,
J
•= random disturbance term in j-th spouse's labor demand equation,
'= random disturbance terra in the j-th spouse's labor supply equation
and Jl-th structure.
The reservation wage (for off-farm work) of an individual is the marginal
value to the household of his (her) time when he (she) allocates all of his
(her) time endowment to farm labor and home time. Given equation (17)-(20),
the equations for the reservation wage are:
= (1/^22^ ^-21 + ^ ^
Thus, the reservation wage for an individual in a 2-adult joint decision-
making farm household is a function of the exogenous variables and random
disturbance terms of his (her) spouse's market labor demand function and the
nonwage exogenous control variables and random disturbance term of his (her)
off-farm labor supply function.
The conditional nature of the econometric structure represented in
equations (l7)-(20) suggests that they are endogenously determined and that
switching of structures is endogenous. Each structure has a particular
probability of occurrence. For the market labor demand equations, the
probabilities are:
.Ri(21) Pj = p^[w^ > >n^]
(22) P^ = >W^] = >SJ^]
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and for the off-farm labor supply functions the probabilities are:
(23.1) Pj2 2 ^ ^ "r "2 ^ "2' ° ''r '^1 ^ "l* ^2 ^ "2''
(23.2) PjQ H (C^) HP^ [W^ >W^, Wj <W®] =P^ <02'•
(23.3) Pq2 HP^ (C3) HP^ [W^ <W^. >W®] =P^ >"2! •
(23.4) Pqo H ^ * "l- "2 ' "2' = ""r '^1 * °1' «2 ' S'•
where indexee decision combinations and where:
+ t®12^®ll^ ^2'
Si 1 " "^1®1 " ^2®2 ^®12^®11^ ~ ^
^2 "^^2^2 ~ ^1^1 ^®2l''®22^ ~ ^®2''®22^ *
Because of Che nonrandom nature of different econometric structures,
the conditional mean values of the disturbance terms of the market labor
demand and off-farm labor supply functions are unlikely to be zero. These
nonzero means are the potential source of sample selection bias when equations
(l7)-<20) are fitted. This problem can be corrected by adding one or more
variables, which are the conditional mean value of the disturbance term, to
each structural equation (Maddala 1981, 1983; Fishe, Trost, and Lurle;
Heckman)
Estimation of the multiple-equation endogenous switching econometric
model, modified for sample selectivity, is made easier by its recursive
structure. The market labor demand functions for husbands and wives can be
fitted by least squares to observations on husbands and wives, respectively,
who participate in off-farm wage work. Ther\ off-farm labor supply equations
can be fitted (i) to subsamples of observations that are matched to the
structures or (ii) to the whole sample. To go the second route, an
unconditional off-farm labor supply function must be obtained by weighting
each of the separate conditional off-farm labor supply functions by its
probability of occurrence:
4
13
?° = Z E(T?|C ) P (C ) +p , Eu, = 0, j - I, 2
J j * r * j j
where E is the expectations operator, T? is defined in equations (19) and
(20), and P^(C.) is defined in equation (23). Because E(T™ C«) « E(T? C.) =
r X. 13 14
£(1^102) = £(1^10^) = 0, the unconditional off-farnn labor supply equations
for the husband and wife are respectively:
(24) = E(T°|Cj^) P^(Cj) +ECT^Ic^) P^CC^) +P*.
(25) =E(l |^c^) P^(C2) +ECl^lCj) F^(C^) +p*.
Each of the two different methods for estimating the off-farm labor
supply functions has advantages and disadvantages. With the first method,
near multicollinearity will be less serious than for the second method, other
things equal. With the first method, the number of observations matching any
one structure can be small relative to the total sample size and relative to
the number matching other structures. Furthermore, the observations, where
off-farm hours are zero, are not used directly in fitting the off-farra labor
supply functions. With the second procedure, all observations are employed to
fit the off-farm labor supply functions. Each husband (wife) in the sample
has a nonzero probability of being included in any one of the four decision
combinations that determine the structure of his (her) off-farm labor supply
function. The additional observations can be helpful in identifying the
parameters of the off-farm labor supply functions (Maddala 1981).
The Data and Empirical Results
The model of off-farm labor supply is to be fitted to data for a random
sample of Iowa farm households collected in 1977.
14
The Data
The data for the empirical analysis were obtained from a micro farm-
household data set. The data set was created from information collected in a
sample survey of Iowa farms and associated farm households. The population of
farms surveyed was all farms having gross farm sales of $2,500 or more in
1976. Farms for interviewing were selected by area probability sampling. The
farm operator was identified as the primary decision-nnaker for the farm
business. The farm operator and spouse, when one was present, make up the
primary household unit. The survey was designed and conducted by the
Statistics Laboratory, Iowa State University. Interviewers collected
extensive information about farm business and household characteristics from
933 households.®*
Husband-wife households of the survey provide the data for this study.
These males and females have traditional divisions of labor or speciali
zations. Husbands allocate most of their time to farm work and wives allocate
most of their hours to home time. However, sixty-five percent of the wives
reported some annual hours of farm work. Off—farm wage work was reported by
25 percent of the husbands and 28 percent of the wives.^
The empirical definitions of the variables and summary statistics are
reported in Table 1. Off-farm wage work is measured in annual hours. Age and
age squared control for non-linear life cycle and work-experience effects in
labor demand functions and off-farm labor supply equations.^^ Two general
schooling variables are considered. Additional formal schooling is expected
to raise off-farm wage offers (Sumner 1982) and to enhance the efficiency of
farm (Huffman 1974) and household production. Being farm raised reflects
early on-the-job farm training, which may affect farming activity choices, and
15
opportunities for obtaining land from relatives for farming. Asset income is
measured by expected income from net worth in farmland and nonfarm assets.
Children of different ages have been shown to differ in their home-time
intensity (Gronau 1977; Leibowitz 1972), so we specify the number of children
at home in three age groups: less than 6 years, 6-11 years, and 12-18 years.
Two location variables are included in the off-farm labor supply and
demand equations. First, a potential costmuting distance variable is defined
as the distance in miles from the farm to the nearest city that has a popula
tion of 10,000 or more. This variable is entered in quadratic form in the
off-farm labor supply equations to permit nonlinear marginal effects of
distance. Second, a dummy variable for location in the eastern versus western
half of the state is defined for the off-farm labor demand equation. With
sufficient geographical immobility of firms and employers, greater density of
urbanization and industrialization in eastern than western sections of the
state may affect farm and off-farm wage rates. Also, some characteristics of
the agricultural environment are different between the regions. Thus, the
regional dummy represents both labor market and agricultural differences. A
separate variable is added, however, to represent the length of the normal
crop growing season, which increases from north to south. A longer growing
season is expected to increase the productivity of farm labor. The growing
season variable is measured by growing-degree days.^^
The Results
Off-farm wrk participation
Probit estimates of parameters for off-farm work participation
equations of two-adult households are displayed in Table 2. Univariate
decisions of husbands and of wives are explained in the two left columns of
* • 19Table 2. Bivariate decisions are explained in the three right columns. All
16
equations are reduced-forms, containing regressors that are assumed to be
eKogenous when off-farm work decisions are made by households.
The equations provide estimated coefficients that are largely consistent
with a priori expectations. The results show that husband's age has a posi
tive but diminishing marginal effect on the probability of the single decision
that his wife works off-farm and on the joint decisions that both he and she
work off-farm and that only his wife works off-farm. Increasing husband's
age, other things equal, reduces the probability of the single decision that
he works off-farm and the joint decision that only he works off-farm. These
age effects, however, are not strong statistically.
General human capital in the form of education strongly affects off-farm
work decisions. In contrast to Sumner's findings for Illinois farmers but in
support of earlier results (Huffman 1980), a husband or wife who has completed
more general schooling has a significantly higher probability of participating
in off-farm work than individuals who have less schooling. Ihe signs and
significance of the estimated coefficients associated with general schooling
are consistent with household decisions based on relative comparative
advantage stemming from prior investment in human capital in the form of
completion of formal training (Becker 1981). Additional husband's schooling
also increases probability of the joint decision that both he and she work
off-farm or that only the husband works off-farm. His additional schooling
reduces the probability that only his wife works off-farm. Additional wife's
schooling also increases the probability of the joint decisions that both he
and she work off-farm and that only she works off-farm. Increases in her
schooling reduce the probability of her husband's off-farm work and of the
joint decision that only he works off-farm. These results are consistent with
the hypothesis that investments in general schooling increase an individual's
17
off-farra wage by more Chan it increases the opportunity cost of their time in
farm and (or) home activities.
Young children have a surprisingly negative effect on both husband's and
wife's off-farm work probabilities. Increasing the number of children under
age 6 causes a statistically significant decrease in the probability that
either the husband or wife works off-farm and the joint decision that both he
and she work off-farm. The effect of additional young children on the prob
ability that only the husband or only the wife works off-farm is not statist
ically different from zero. Additional children age 6-12 years cause statis
tically significant reductions of probabilities that the wife works off-farm
and only she works off-farm. Increases in the number of children ages 6-12
years increases the probabilities that the 'lusband works off-farm and that
only he works off-farm, however, the effects are not statistically signif
icant. The presence of older children 12-18 years of age has no statistically
significant ef'fect on off-farm work probabilities.
Off-fano jobs are concentrated in cities. Thus, the expected comimiting
distance and cost of commuting increases for households located at greater
distance from urban areas. Holding the off-farm wage constant, a longer
commute, i.e., larger MCITY, reduces the nei: wage and has the expected
negative and significant effect of reducing the probability that either one or
both of the adults work off-farm. The negative effect of MCITY diminishes as
MCITY increases. Off-fam jobs are more numerous and evenly dispersed in the
eastern than in the western region of the state. Also agri-climate conditions
differ. Unexpectedly a household being located in the western region of the
state tends to increase the probability of .?ither or both adults working off-
farm. As expected a longer agricultural growing season, i.e., larger GDD,
reduces the probability that the husband works off-farm.
18
BeLng farm raised, as expected, significantly reduces the probability of
any off-farm work by the husband, and also reduces the probability chat his
wife works off-farm. Larger asset income reduces the probability that either
or both of the adults works off-farm. The effect of additional asset income
is positive on the probabilities of the joint decision that only husband or
wife works off-farm, however, the effect is not statistically
significant.
Off-farm labor demand functions
The off-farm labor demand functions (see equations 21-23) for husbands
and wives are fitted to observations contained in the three subsample data
sets. Each of the demand equations contains two sample selection
13
variables.
The estimated coefficients of the labor demand functions, reported in
Table 3, are consistent with expectations. The dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of the hourly wage. An individual's schooling has a
positive effect on his (her) wage rate. A one year increase in general
schooling for the husband, all else equal, increases his hourly wage 5.6
percent. For the wife, a one year increase in her schooling increases her
hourly wage 4.5 percent. An individual's experience (EXPj), measured as Age^
- Ed. - 6, has a positive but diminishing marginal effect on In W^, j = 1, 2.
As expected, the regional dummy variable indicates lower hourly wages for the
western region and indicates approximately 30 percent lower hourly rates for
women. The estimates of coefficients for the sample selection variables, G's,
suggest the existence of statistically significant sample selection effects on
labor demand.
19
Off-farm labor supply functions
Although both conditional and unconditional off-farm labor supply
equations are fitted, results from the unconditional equations are evaluated
most extensively. When the conditional off-farm labor supply equations for
husbands (wives), adjusted for bivariate sample selectivity, were fitted to
matched subsamples, the t-ratios on all the estimated coefficients were small,
2
but R s were respectable in size for microdata, e.g., .10 to .31. These poor
results seem to be due to generally small subsample sizes, e.g., 70 households
where the husband and wife both worked off-farm and only modestly larger
14observation numbers for the other subsamples, and near-multicollinearity.
See Appendix 2.
To overcome these problems, we made two changes. First, we changed to
the unconditional off-farm labor supply equations, equations (24) and (25),
where all observations for husbands and wives, respectively, are pooled
together into a Tobit-type (Tobin) equation. Second, we changed from the
least squares to the ridge-regression estimator.The ridge estimator
frequently has relatively good properties when near-multicollinearity is a
problem (Vinod 1978; Lin and Kmenta 1982).
Several variants of the ridge-regression estimator exist (Amemiya 1985,
Ch. 2). Although the Bayesian version (Amemiya 1985, p. 61) provides an
appealing method for estimating the ridge scalar (y), this procedure failed
because the estimate of f was larger than one. The procedure we employed next
is suggested by Koerl, Kennard, and Baldwin (1975). Their procedure resulted
in estimates of Y of 0.31 and 0.55 for the off—farm labor supply equations of
husbands and wives, respectively. Stability of the ridge estimators was
checked and estimates of y were shown to change by less than one-tenth of one
percent for each .01 increment to y«
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Estimates of Tobit-type incremental responses of expected annual off-farm
hours to changes in the exogenous variables for the Iowa farm households are
presented in Table 4. For adults of a given sex, a joint test was performed
on the coefficients to see if nonwage variables had similar coefficients in
the two household structures. This test for husbands in decision groups 1 and
2, and for wives in groups 1 and 3 was rejected at the 1 percent significance
level.The incremental expected response elasticities for the population of
husbands (wives) are weighted averages of responses for the different response
structures. For example, the own-wage elasticity of husbands' expected
off-farm work is ^122^10* absolute change in husbands'
expected off-farm hours if ^ ^122^10^ When variables appear
in equations for evaluating incremental effects of exogenous variables, they
are set at sample mean values. The estimates of expected incremental
responses of husband's and wife's annual off-farm hours to the exogenous
variables may seem small. (See Table 5.) This is because the response
coefficients are weighted by the probability that any off-farm work occurs,
and these probabilities are relatively small.
Age has a positive but diminishing marginal effect on his off-farm hours
in households where both the husband and wife work off-farm. In these
households, the effect of husband's age on his wife's off-farm hours is
positive and slightly increasing. In households where only the husband works
off-farm, his age has a positive and slightly increasing marginal effect on
his off-farm hours. In households where only the wife works off-farm, an
increase in his age has a positive but diminishing marginal effect on her
hours of off-farm work. The net result is that an increase in husband's age
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increases the expected hours of off-farm work of husbands as a group and wives
as a group. The elasticities of expected response are 0.1 and 0.75,
respectively.
Although income elasticities of off-farm work are a priori ambiguous in
sign, the positive income elasticity of husbands' off-farm hours indicates
that their leisure time is an inferior good. For wives, leisure time is a
normal good. For the population, the asset income elasticity of expected
off-farm hours is small, being -0.01 for husbands and 0.01 for wives.
Although these income elasticities are small and have small t-ratios, their
signs are consistent with studies of male and female labor supply for wage
earning nonfarm household members (Keeley).
The own-wage elasticity of expected off-farm work hours for the popula
tion of husbands and wives residing on Iowa farms is positive. This occurs
because the estimated wage elasticities of off-farm hours for all household
types are positive. The own elasticity is 0.03 for husbands and 0.09 for
wives. A one dollar per hour Increase in the off-farm wage rate increases
husbands' annual off-farm work by an average of 2,3 hours per year and wives
by an average of 9 hours per year. Cross-w.ige elasticities of expected off-
farm labor supply are also positive, and their size compares favorably with
the own-wage elasticities.
Other things equal, an increase in either adult's education increases
expected off-farm work by husbands and wives. This result is consistent with
a number of different farm and household production and income effects. The
ovm-elasticity effects are the same for husbands and wives (0.22), but the
expected incremental change of hours is larger for husbands than for wives
(7.5 hours per year versus 2.6). The own effects of general schooling on
expected off-farm hours and the previously noted positive impact of schooling
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on off-farm work participation support the results reported by Huffman.
An increase in the number of children who are less than 6 years of age
per household increases husbands' expected off-farm work by an average of 39
hours per year and reduces average off-farra hours of wives by 14 per year»
For husbands, the positive effect of additional young children on expected
off-farm hours is a result of the positive effect (elasticity of 1.17) in
households where only the husband works off-farm dominating the negative
effect (elasticity of -0.52) in households where both adults work off-farm.
For wives, the estimated coefficients on are negative in both household
structures, and they are not significantly different when both the husband and
wife work off-farra or when only the wife works off-farm. The relatively
larger effect of young children on husbands' off-farm hours is contrary to the
effects of additional young children on hours of work of nonfarm married
males. For these households, a larger nvmiber of children ages 6-11 or 12-18
increases both adult's expected off-farm work hours, and the expected increase
is larger for husbands than for wives.
Although a larger MCITY reduces the probability that husbands and wives
participate in off-farm work, a larger MCITY increases expected off-farm hours
of husbands. The positive effect on husband's hours for households where only
the husband works off-farm outweighs the negative effect for households where
both adults work off-farm. For wives, the negative effect of MCITY for house
holds where only the wife works off-farm is dominate. For husbands, these
results are surprising because leisure is an inferior good. The elasticity
estimates are 0.15 for husbands and -0.03 for wives.
A longer growing season (larger GDD) increases expected off-farm work
hours of husbands and wives. The direction of the responses is the same in
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all household structures. The estimated elasticities are 0.43 and 0.26 for
husbands and wives, respectively.
Conclusions
This study has considered joint decisions of farm households for
husband's and wife's labor supplied to the external labor market. Binding
non-negativity constraints were frequently encountered for these decisions.
To accommodate these complexities, a multiple-equation econometric model was
developed where endogenous switching of econometric structures of the off-farm
labor supply equations occurred whenever a binding non-negativity constraint
occurred,
Multiple binding non-negativity constraints are reasonably common
phenomena in empirical research. They may arise whenever a number of joint
decisions are being made by economic agents. In agriculture, farmers made
decisions on multiple outputs, and in a sample of farms, a significant share
of them will be against non-negativity constraints for two or more outputs.
In nonfarm households, multiple binding non-negativity constraints can be
expected to occur when husband's and wife's labor supply decisions are
considered jointly with demand decisions for commodities. These complexities
are, however, seldom explicitly incorporated into econometric models.
Our experience may be useful to others. We encountered several problems
when we implemented our econometric model that was adapted for two binding
non-negativity constraints. For the conditional off-farm supply structure,
these problems included (i) small subsample sizes for each endogenous
structure and (ii) small t-ratios for estimated coefficients. The alternative
specification of unconditional off-farm labor supply equations permitted us to
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use all of the observations in estimation, but it suffered from near-multi-
collinearity. These are all problems that other researchers might expect to
encounter when they attempt to model a larger number of joint decisions of
economic agents and to fit econometric models incorporating the effects of
multiple binding non-negativity constraints.
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* •
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Farm households are predominantly of the husband-wife type. In our
survey, they accounted for 92 percent of all farm households.
2 .In a two-period model the role of saving and investing are more Integral
to optimizing behavior.
3 . ...
This specification neglects the time cost of commuting. M is treated as
fixed.
4 The assumption of wage independency from current hours worked is common
in labor supply studies. For some exceptions see Hausman or Rosen.
^For the data set employed in this study, less than 10 percent of total
farm hours are (from outside the household).
^In this model economic outcomes are certain. The introduction of
risk-neutral attitude toward uncertainty into the model will not change the
predictions of the model.
^The equations for the means of the disturbance terms are derived in
Appendix A.
g
The response rate was a relatively high 88 percent and the Statistical
Laboratory frequently called back households to obtain missing information and
to verify information. The survey of Illinois farmers, which provided the
data for Sumner's off-farm labor supply study, had only a 40 percent return
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rate. Because of nonrandora selection, nonresponse is a potential source of
biased regression results (Heckman 1979).
9
There are 771 husband-wife households used in this study. Of the 933
total households, eighty-nine vtere excluded because they were-not a husband-
wife household type and the remainder were excluded because of missing
essential data.
^^We include husband's but not wife's age in labor supply equations. This
reduces problems with multicollinearity and interpretation because husband's
and wife's age will be highly correlated.
Acres operated and farm capital in machinery and livestock are excluded
from the set of regressors because they are household decision variables which
are determined jointly with time allocation,
12These are approximate bivariate probabilities. The procedure employed
here takes account of the correlation of husband's and wife's off-farm work
decisions and is a significant improvement over the univariate probabilities
which assumes that participation decisions of spouses are independent.
13Ordinary least squares estimates of these wage equations when sample
selection terms are included yields statistically consistent estimates
(Maddala 1983; Lee, Maddala, Trost).
14Also, Nelson (1984) has shown that multiple step estimation procedures
frequently have relatively low efficiency.
For the model, X ~ !•'» class of estimators defined by B(y)
(X'X +YI) ^ X'jT are called ridge estimators. The ridge scalar is Y.
Vinod (1978) concludes that decisions from tests of hypotheses that
employ the ridge regressor may be affected by the bias of the estimator. The
stability of the estimator, however, proves quite useful in estimating
marginal effects and elasticities.
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Table 1. A Summary of finpirical Definitions and Means of Variables (771
observations)
Mean
Variables Definitions Symbol (Std. Dev*)
A. Endogenous
Univariate off-farm work status for indivi- P, 0.25
dual j, j = 1 (husband), 2 (wife) — A 1,0 (0.43)
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the
individual reports positive annual hours of P2 0.28
off-farm work, and 0 otherwise. (0.45)
Bivariate off-farm work status
a) A1,0 dummy variable taking a value Pj^2 .099
of 1 if both the husband and wife
report off-farm wage work, and 0
otherwise.
b) A1,0 dummy variable taking a value Pj^q ,119
of 1 if the husband reports off-farm
wage work but wife does not, and 0
otherwise.
c) A1,0 dummy variable taking a value Pq2 .145
of 1 if the wife reports positive off-
farm wage work but husband does not,
and 0 otherwise,
d) A1,0 dummy variable taking a value Pqq .595
of 1 if neither husband nor wife
report any off-farm wage work.
Off-farm labor — Annual hours of off-farm 305.3
work for a wage or salary. This excludes (694.0)
work at a nonfarm self-employed business 292.8
and custom or contract work on another farm. (617,1)
Off-farm wage rate — Annual earnings from 3.97
off-farm wage and salary income divided by (2.9)
annual hours of off-farm wage work for j-th W2 4.35
individual ($/hr). (14.5)
Exogenous
Husband's age in years. This variable is AG^ 47.9
also squared. (12.8)
Education — Years of formal schooling com- EDj^ 11.3
pleted. This excludes vocational training (2.3)
obtained in a business or trade school. ED« 12.1
(1.9)
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Table 1. Continued.
Variables Definitions Symbol
Farm raised — A 1,0 dummy variable, D(FRAIS£D^)
taking a value of 1 if husband was
raised on a farm, and 0 otherwise.
OF
Asset income — An estimate of annual V
household interest income from the house
hold's net worth in farmland, stocks,
bonds and nonfarm businesses.
Children — Number of children in ihe
household by age group, (1) < 6 years,
(2) 6-11 years, and (3) 12-18 years.
Distance to a city — The number of miles
from the farmstead to the nearest city
that has a population of 10,000 or more.
This variable is also squared.
K,
K,
K.
'3
MCITY
Geographical region — A 1 ,0 dummy vari- D(WEST)
able, taking a value of 1 if a household
is located in the western half of the
state, and 0 otherwise.
Growing degree days — A measure of the GDD
normal crop growing season, measured as
average growing-degree-days accumulated
between spring and fall dates of < 10
percent frost probability.
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
0.93
(0.25)
11,613.4
(29,792.)
0 .26
(0 .39)
0..50
(0,.85)
0,.73
(1,.07)
27,.5
(14,.5)
0.51
(0.50)
2954.4
(149.2)
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Table 2. Probit Estimates of Univariate and Bivariate Probabilities of Off-
Farm Work of Iowa Farmers and Their Spouses, 1976. (Absolute values
of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
Pi ^2 ^12 PlO ^02
A
AGi -0.00177
(0.44)
0.0392
(1.02)
0.0598
(1.01)
-0.0186
(0.42)
0.0402
(0.98)
• %
AG^ -0.00019
(0.44)
-0.0007
(1.61)
-0.0009
(1.39)
0.0001
(0.15)
-0.0006
(1.38)
• ft
EDj^ 0.0879
(2.98)
0.0429
(1.51)
0.0789
(1.92)
0.0507
(1.51)
-0.0023
(0.07)
ED2 -0.0793
(2.39)
0.0718
(2.24)
0.0001
(0.00)
-0.1053
(2.76)
0.0918
(2.66)
D(FRAISED^) -0.5041
(2.47)
-0.2967
(1.45)
-0.5538
(2.29)
-0.2089
(0.90)
0.1473
(0.59)
^1 -0.2382
(2.19)
-0.3197
(2.92)
-0.3041
(2.09)
-0.0788
(0.65)
-0.2091
(1.76)
K2 0.0276
(0.41)
-0.1706
(2.41)
-0.1107
(1.17)
0.0675
(0.91)
-0.1681
(2.11)
•^3 0.0528
(0.99)
-0.0379
(0.72)
0.0633
(0.91)
0.0266
(0.44)
-0.0942
(1.55)
D(W) 0.1761
(1.57)
0.1354
(1.25)
0.2022
(1.33)
0.1088
(0.87)
0.0510
(0.43)
^OF -0.0107
(0.99)
-0.0082
(0.77)
-0.0393
(2.71)
0.0128
(1.04)
0.0127
(1.08)
CITY -0.0501
(3.78)
-0.0314
(2.41)
-0.0542
(3.28)
-0.0271
(1.84)
-0.0024
(0.16)
CITY^ 0.0008
(3.66)
-0.0004
(2.20)
0.0008
(3.05)
0.0004
(1.86)
0.0001
(0.05)
GDD -0.0008
(1.91)
0.0001
(0.15)
0.0001
(0.09)
-0.0009
(2.18)
0.0001
(0.30)
%
CONSTANT 3.2459
(2.12)
1.5559
(1.04)
-1.6227
(0.75)
3.3106
(1.95)
3.0119
(1.86)
'•k
/2
64.52 58.56 59.81 25.41 26.38
%
n « 771
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Table 3. Off-Farm Labor Demand Functions: Iowa Farm Households, 1976
(Absolute values of t-ratios in parentheses)
Constant
EDUC-
EXP-
EXPJ
D(W)
Gil
•12
R-'
n-k
Husband
0.7142
(1.81)
0.0558
(2.45)
0.0343
(2.07)
-0.0007
(2.15)
-0.0964
(1,11)
-0.0053
(2.05)
-0.0013
(2.07)
0.19
170
a/—See Appendix for definition of Gs
Constant
EDUC.
EXP.
EXPj
D(W)
G
21
22
Wife
0.2193
(0.29)
0.0447
(1.77)
0.0603
(2.04)
-0.0013
(2.07)
-0.2988
(1.90)
-0.0017
(1.59)
-0.0004
(1.58)
0.09
190
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Table A. Tobit-Type Ridge-Regression Estimates of Off-Farm Labor Supply
Functions for Iowa Farmers and Their Wives, 1976. (Absolute values
of approximate t-ratios in parentheses)
In (off-•farm hours)
Variables/
coefficients *Pl2
Husbands
*Pl0
Wives
*Pl2 *^02 ±
InWj^ 0.1903
(3.76)
0.0687
(l.OI)
0.1129
(2.59)
lnW2 0.4858
(2.51)
0.2984
(2.02)
0.3952
(2.17)
AG^ 0.0224
(2.37)
0.0128
(1.73)
0.0134
(1.73)
0.0078
(0.92)
AG^ -0.0002
(0.51)
0.0002
(0.09)
0.0002
(0.58)
-0.0001
(0.36)
0.1132
(4.21)
0.0586
(1.97)
0.0478
(2.31)
0.0295
(0.97)
ED2 0.1047
(3.73)
0.0563
(1.58)
0.0564
(2.73)
0.0747
(3.23)
D(FRAISED^) 0.1669
(0.24)
0.6185
(0.99)
0.0661
(0.11)
1.2663
(2.58)
-0.5195
(0.52)
1.1680
(1.52)
-0.4223
(0.48)
-0.3373
(0.55)
K2 0.2011
(0.38)
0.2281
(0.62)
-0.3065
(0.69)
0.4866
(0.93)
K3 0.6676
(1.68)
0.0889
(0.29)
-0.1522
(0.46)
0.0753
(0.26)
CITY -0.0106
(0.99)
0.0371
(2.27)
0.0046
(0.51)
-0.0044
(0.36)
CITY^ -0,0003
(1.62)
0.0008
(2.11)
0.0001
(0.31)
-0.0002
(0.61)
0.0581
(0.77)
0.0141
(0.28)
-0.0188
(0.29)
-0.0651
(1.62)
GDD 0.0006
(5.37)
0.0006
(5.29)
0.0003
(3.39)
0.0004
(3.43)
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Table 4. Continued
•^31 0.0002 -0.0021
i (0.38) (3.39)
K ' ®32 %2 -O.QOOl -0.0021
(0.38) (3.49)
i ' G33 or G^3 -0.0002 0.0002
(0.32) (0.31)
*^34 S4 -0.0001
(0.46)
-0.0009
(2.72)
INTERCEPT 0.0808
(0.35)
1.1231
(3.13)
0.41 0.12
n - k 740 740
s /—'The variables in each regression equation were multiplied by the
probability that appears at the top of the column.
—^See Appendix for definition of Gs.
Ta
ble
5.
Es
tim
ate
s
of
Ex
pec
ted
Inc
rem
en
tal
Re
spo
nse
of
Of
f-F
aon
Ho
urs
to
Ch
ang
es
in
Ex
oge
nou
sV
ari
ab
les
:
low
a
Fa
rm
Ho
us
eh
old
s,
19
76
.
(E
va
lua
ted
at
sam
ple
me
an
s)
V
a
r
ia
b
le
s
^1 ^2 ^O
F
ED
^
K2 ^3 A
Gi
C
IT
Y
G
D
D
H
u
sb
an
d R
e
la
ti
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
(e
la
st
ic
it
y
)
A
b
s
o
lu
te
e
f
f
e
c
t
(h
o
u
rs
/y
r)
A
b
s
o
lu
te
e
f
f
e
c
t
(h
o
u
rs
/y
r)
W
if
e
R
e
la
ti
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
(
e
la
s
ti
c
it
y
)
2
.2
7
0
.0
3
0
.8
6
0
.0
3
6
.3
8
0
.0
7
8
.9
4
0
.0
9
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
1
-
0
.0
1
2
-
0
.0
1
7
.5
A
0
.2
2
1
.
4
0
.1
1
7
.0
7
0
.2
1
2
.5
6
0
.2
1
3
8
,6
0
.0
2
-
1
4
.1
-
0
.0
3
1
9
.7
0
.0
3
6
.4
4
0
.0
2
3
1
.4
0
.0
6
0
.5
9
0
.0
1
0
.3
1
9
0
.1
0
2
.7
5
0
.7
5
2
.2
5
0
.1
5
-
0
.1
7
4
-
0
.0
3
0
.0
5
8
0
.4
3
0
.0
1
3
0
.2
6
L
J
O
O
4-
39
Appendix A
y, a.2 Pj ®21
Recall that C, = v« + + -— v, and 5 « v + -— + --— v,
^ ^ ^11 11 II 3^2 ^22 ^
where Vj^, v^, Uj^, and H2 assumed normally distributed random variables, then
E[Vj/Cj^, ^2^ ~Pij.2 ^^1 ^ ^2j"l ^^2 ^ ~ expectations operator and
p. . ^ are the coefficients from the regression v. ~Pj^*,2 ^1 ^^2**1 ^2 ^
^ J * >3 *1 J J
= 1, 2, Eipj = 0. Furthermore, assume that the two sets of random disturbance
terms v^, C and ^2 trivariate normal distributions.
Then (Johnson and Kotz) the means of the off-farm hours equations for the
selected subsamples are:
E(Mij) = E[p^/5i > a,,
° > "l> «2 > °2l ^ > °1' «2 > "2I
^1^1 ^2 ^12 ^1 ^2 ^1^2 ^2 ^1
' "h^l'h ^12 '"^2 '«2 ' \h\ '^•'?2^ '^*112^31^*212S2-
" ^ "l' ^2 ^ "2^ •*• ^ "1* ^2 ^ ^2^
^1^1 ^2 10 ^1 ^1 ^2 ^P2 ^2 ^1
E(p^^) = >«!.?, >n^] = ' "2'
" pc p -e ^ H h ^*''i Eh '• '^h^1^2 ^2 12 ^1^1 ^2 ^r2 ^2 ^1
E(p„) = >a,] = ^ >"2I
= ' "l' ^ < °1'^2 >"2I
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=p, ,1 [0.2 f_ (l-F**)+o_ (1-F*)]
^1^2*^2 02 ^1 ^1 2 12 ^1
'•''C2''2*^1 ^02 • ''«iC2^2 '^"'''i22''43''*22i'^ 44'
"^1^2 ♦ "^1^2 »
where F_ = F- ft. =—«« , F. * F_ - ft, 5—
^1 ^1^0^ ^ ^1 ^2 o-
^2 ^2
°E 5
** 12 «
=^5, "1 ^ — S-11 Op
^2
The wage equations for husbands (wives) are pooled over the two different
household types where they work for a wage. The means of the disturbance terms
in the wage equation are:
E(v^^) = E[v^/5^ > Cj >"2' ° "i.52^"2^
=Pr r 4 [0? fr * "f E h
^l'r^2 ^12 ^1^1 ^2 ^1^2 ^2 ^1
E(v^2) =E[vj/S^ >2^.52 ?«2' = ^ ^
= Pr r 4 t^r fc (1-^r > - "r F fr (l-fj; >1
^l^l'^2 10 ^1^1 2 ^1^2 ^2 1
* V-i J ^"l h ^ "5,?,^5. ^5, '^^ ''lll'^ ll'^ ''21l''l2'
^2 1 ^1 10 ^2 ^2 1 12 ^1 2
E(v2i) =Elv^/Ci >"i.Cz >fij] =^tPejV^.e/l ^ ' ''zl
= p, , i [0? f, (1-F. ) + 0^ , fp (1-F )]
^1^2-«2 ^2 ^1^1 ^2 ^1^2 ^2 «1
'^'«2^2*«1 ^12 '^"''52 '^"'i22''2i"'22iS2'
ECv^^) =E[.^n, ? >S' = ^"l'^ 2 >"2I
=p, , i lo? (l-rf) +<'££«£;
^02 ^1^1 ^2 ^1^2 ^2 ^1
''^ 2-2-^l ^2 '''^ 2'^ 2 '^"'52 '^"'122''21 '^'22iS2
'• \
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Appendix B. Least Squares Estimates of Off-Farm Labor Supply Functions for
Husbands and Wives: Iowa Farm Household Subgroups, 1976.
(Absolute values of t-ratios in parentheses)
Variables
In (off--farm hours)
Husbands Wives
Group 12 Group 10 Group 12 Group 02
InW, -5.243 -0.483 0.096 —
1.
(1.11) (0,19) (0.024)
lnW2 2.674 — -0.155 0.647
(1.26) (0.09) (0.82)
AG, 0.078 -0.041 0.065 -0.097
(0.30) (0.17) (0.29) (0.76)
agJ -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.30) (0.12) (0.40) (0.84)
0.166 0.152 -0.101 -0.052
(0.71) (0.86) (0.51) (0.72)
ED2 -0.308 0.116 0.031 0.009
(1.32) (0.96) (0.15) (0.09)
D(FRAISEDj^) -0.116 -0.757 -0.001 -0.066
(0.23) (1.27) (0.00) (0.11)
^1 0.753 -0.707 -0.220 -0.245
(1.28) (1.64) (0.44) (0.68)
K2 0.062 -0.223 -0.146 0.002
(0.20) (0.84) (0.55) (0.001)
K3 0.290 0.193 -0.128 -0.154
(1.69) (1.29) (0.88) (1.13)
CITY -0.003 -0.062 0.046 0.051
(0.06) (1.41) (0.99) (1.28)
CITY^ 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.13) (1.18) (0.76) (1.38)
InVoF -0.021 0.008 -0.024 0.007
(0.61) (0.26) (0.81) (0,28)
GDD -0.021 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.61) (0.51) (0.53) (1.41)
Appendix B* Continued
G../p..
ij iJ
G../p.•
ij
-0.011
(0.77)
0.001
(0.21)
0.31
60
42
-0.080
(0.63)
0.016
(0.52)
0.20
93
0.003
(0.23)
0.001
(0.33)
0.28
60
0.003
(0.77)
-0.000
(0.00)
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